What was the situation for that group/institution before Gorbachev became Premier?
Before the rule of Gorbachev, the military was under the control of Brezhnev. During his rule, an agreement was signed with the US which banned antiballistic missiles (ABM). This signature “helped to assure a continuing arms race, which was mitigated only to a limited extent by negotiated strategic arms limitations. Both sides also settled for protracted Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] conventional arms talks without agreements - and with conventional arms proposals that sought only to stability existing levels” (Frank 199). During Brezhnev’s rule, the “influence and power of the military had significantly increased; indeed, the early Brezhnev years have aptly been termed the “golden age” of the high command’ (Larrabee 1002-1003).
The military was used as a way to force decisions that favored Brezhnev’s opinions. However, in the latter part of Brezhnev’s rule, the Soviet Government began to re-allocate their money and time to other branches of the government, but this made many people uneasy because the US’s military was growing, while the Soviet Military was slowly but surely decreasing in size. Tensions between Brezhnev and the other military leaders began to rise so much so that Brezhnev delivered a speech to convince the military leaders that the money was needed for other causes. However, even after Brezhnev’s death just a couple weeks later, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov continued to push for more money to be awarded to the military.
How did that group/institution interpret the application of those policies to it?
During the Brezhnev rule, his policy to decrease the aid and money to the military was not received well. Many generals pushed for Brezhnev to change his mind because the Soviet Union had always relied on their military, so there was no reason to stop that now. Gorbachev took over and then a new era of policies started. Gorbachev stepped into a government with tensions so even though he mainly wanted to focus on fixing and building the Soviet Union from the inside out, he realized nothing would be accomplished without the military leaders on his side. Thus, “the application of New Thinking to military doctrine under Gorbachev proceeded gradually, but with intensified momentum beginning in 1987” (Frank 200).
Gorbachev slightly loosened the tight grip the previous leadership had placed on the amount of money flowing into the military. At a meeting in 1985, Gorbachev stated that “the military would have to do better with less and should expect no increase in resources” (Frank 200), and this time, the military leaders were more understanding because some of the past leaders from Brezhnev’s rule had been replaced. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Vasili Petrov, and General Alexei Yepishev retired at the beginning of Gorbachev’s rule, which allowed for him to have a team of military officers who did not make their decisions based on their experiences in war. Gorbachev wanted to turn the military away from conflict and war, and more towards fixing and rebuilding the Soviet Union. During one of the meetings to discuss how the military was going to be used, it was stated: “I fully understand that the army, as an unsociable body, mostly ignores the cries of the 'mob' and looks very skeptically upon anti-war 'amusements' of the nonofficial public. But it seems the time has come-long-awaited and blessed-when the theme 'army and society' might become a topic of public discussion" (Holloway 6). Even the public began to realize that the military could be used for other uses than blowing things up.
The military for the most part supported Gorbachev’s new policies, but that doesn’t mean that it wasn’t hard and that there weren’t many disagreements. The Soviet Army used to be praised and put in main priority, but now things were changing and “many officers have embraced perestroika and glasnost, and the diversity that glasnost has revealed should make us careful not to generalize about military attitudes. But it is clear that there is widespread unhappiness in the military with the way in which Soviet society is developing” (Holloway 22).
How did the Soviet state apply those policies to that group/institution, and what were the effects?
As previously stated, the reaction to all of Gorbachev’s changes was more positive than that of Brezhnev because of all of the changes in the main military positions. In fact, “Marshal Ogarkov's "transfer" to command the Western Theater of Military Operations deprived the military of its most vigorous and outspoken advocate in the upper ranks of the Soviet leadership in Moscow” (Herspring 42). Since the most powerful and influential leaders were now out of office, he was able to make the changes he wanted to. The two most influential and well-known policies of Gorbachev are glasnost and perestroika. The popularity of Perestroika was mainly due to “the choice of Deputy Defense Minister General Dimitri Yazov to replace Sokolov, however, came as a surprise to many observers. A relatively junior officer with a background in personnel, Yazov is typical of the new generation of officers whom Gorbachev seems to favor. As commander of the Far Eastern Military District he earned a reputation as an efficient commander and a strong supporter of perestroika, or restructuring. His writings have focused on ways of improving efficiency, raising troop morale and adapting high technology to military affairs - all themes stressed by Gorbachev as well” (Larrabee 1009). Gorbachev knew that he could not accomplish anything without the military on his side, so he did this by replacing well liked and very powerful officials with new men who would agree with his ideas.
What was the significance of Gorbachev’s reforms as it pertained to that group/institution?
Gorbachev knew when he took office that he was stepping into a government with tensions about the decline in the use and popularity of the military. He decided to bring major changes from inside the military board itself to ensure that his changes would be favored. Not only did his reforms bring about changes in the military, but the “dual program of perestroika and glasnost introduced profound changes in economic practice, internal affairs and international relations” (Larrabee). Gorbachev realized that the military was not using its portion of money effectively and efficiently, which led to the creation of Perestroika, “for it is the military drain on the economy that has been the basic driver behind perestroika” (Corcoran).
Under perestroika, the power and control of the Soviet military was drastically decreased, because “the Soviets no longer have the option of being a military superpower and threatening to conquer the West. In the post-war period, they expended their limited resources in military efforts and used the coercive basis of their society to protect the privileged position of the elite. That has brought Soviet society to the brink of economic ruin. The badly outmoded Soviet industrial sector can no longer support an overgrown military machine. Nor can it maintain the already low civilian standard of living, a failure that threatens to produce an explosive public reaction. Modernization is imperative, and the needed resources can only come from a drastic cut in military spending” (Corcoran). With Gorbachev’s policies, a new era of government decision making and control without the pressing eyes of the military had started.
Bibliography
Corcoran, Edward A. "Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications For U.S. Policy."Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications For U.S. Policy. The Cato Institute, n.d. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa133.html>.
Frank, Willard C. Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev: 1915-1991. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1992. Print.
Herspring, Dale R. "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 36.4, Soviet Foreign Policy (1987): 42-53. JSTOR. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <__http://www.jstor.org/stable/1173832__>.
Holloway, David. "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev." International Security 14.3 (1989): 5-24. JSTOR. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <__http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538930__>.
Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Foreign Affairs 66.5 (1988): 1002-026. JSTOR. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <__http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043575__>.
What was the situation for that group/institution before Gorbachev became Premier?
How did that group/institution interpret the application of those policies to it?
How did the Soviet state apply those policies to that group/institution, and what were
the effects?
What was the significance of Gorbachev’s reforms as it pertained to that group/institution?
Bibliography
Corcoran, Edward A. "Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications For U.S. Policy."Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications For U.S. Policy. The Cato Institute, n.d. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa133.html>.
Frank, Willard C. Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev: 1915-1991. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1992. Print.
Herspring, Dale R. "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 36.4, Soviet Foreign Policy (1987): 42-53. JSTOR. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <__http://www.jstor.org/stable/1173832__>.
Holloway, David. "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev." International Security 14.3 (1989): 5-24. JSTOR. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <__http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538930__>.
Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Foreign Affairs 66.5 (1988): 1002-026. JSTOR. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <__http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043575__>.